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Report Summary
Reverse mortgages are loans against home equity that do not have to be repaid
until the borrower moves, sells the home, or dies.  The loans generally are available only
to older homeowners, usually aged 62 or over.  Generally, the proceeds of the loans may
be used for any purpose.
Studies of reverse mortgages may shed light on many areas in longevity research.
These include poverty alleviation of older homeowners, long-term-care financing, the
retirement decision, lifetime wealth management, investment in retraining or continuing
education, independent living and health through home modifications, and
intergenerational wealth transfers.
This study explores whether consumer interest in reverse mortgages is influenced
by the strength of areas family and community ties.  The degree of out-migration by
young and old residents is the primary measure used to estimate the strength of these ties.
Twenty-six geographically dispersed metropolitan areas in the United States, comprising
135 counties, were selected for analysis.  Other types of reverse mortgages are briefly
described, but the FHA-insured Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) is given a
more detailed treatment and is used to address the research question.
Besides out-migration of the young and old, other variables that measure family
and community ties include the degree of religious adherence in the county, the percent
of its residents that were born in that state, its racial composition, and its educational
achievement.  The difference in the market penetration of HECMs across counties also is
considered.
Fairly strong evidence that family and community ties do influence consumer
interest in HECMs is found.  A higher incidence of young out-migration, reflecting weak
family and community ties of the young, tends to increase demand for reverse mortgages.
The opposite is found for old out-migration, which implies that when older residents are
not attached to their communities, they will be less interested in reverse mortgages.  The
percent of persons born in the same state as their current residence is found to negatively
influence demand.  Racial composition, educational achievement, and the extent of
market penetration in an area also are found to influence demand for reverse mortgages.
The findings of this study suggest that governmental agencies and financial
institutions should be sensitive to family and community ties when designing and
marketing programs, such as the HECM, which are intended to help older individuals.
The kinds of outreach and informational efforts that would be appropriate for a given
program, perhaps even the viability of a program altogether, will depend at least partly on
the nature of an areas family and community ties.  In the present case, more traditional,
family-oriented areas are less likely than others to show interest in reverse mortgages.
This idea may be extended to the international level.  For example, the reverse mortgage
market is unlikely to thrive, at least any time soon, in such countries as Japan, where
intergenerational bonds traditionally are strong.
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1I. Introduction
Reverse mortgages are loans against home equity that do not have to be repaid
until the borrower moves, sells the home, or dies.  The loans generally are available
only to older homeowners, usually aged 62 or over.  This paper explores whether
demand for reverse mortgages1 is influenced by the strength of areas family and
community ties.  Several previous studies have reported estimates of the potential
demand for reverse mortgages.  This study examines how actual demand may be
determined, and of how it may be related to potential demand.
The life-cycle model of consumption theorizes that after a certain age,
households begin to draw down wealthincluding home equityin order to smooth
consumption over time.  Homeowners with a bequest motive, however, may be less
inclined to do this because they would like to leave an inheritance.  In areas of weak
family ties, the bequest motive should be relatively weak.  Homeowners in these
areas will be less concerned about preserving wealth for future generations, and more
likely to draw down wealth in line with the life-cycle hypothesisunless, that is, the
homeowners do not want to stay in the community.  In areas where their ties to the
community are relatively weak, older homeowners will be less likely to exhibit
interest in reverse mortgages.  This paper analyzes both the strength of an areas
family ties and the degree to which its older residents are attached to the community
for their effects on demand for reverse mortgages.
Reverse mortgages are one way for homeowners in the United States to draw
down home equity.  In contrast to a conventional forward mortgage, monthly
repayments are not required on a reverse mortgage.  Interest on the cash
disbursements2 to the borrower continues to accrue over the life of the loan and to be
added to the outstanding debt.3  The loan becomes due and payable (in full) only
when the borrower ceases to use the home as the primary residence, sells it, or dies.4
The home equity, not the creditworthiness of the borrower, secures a reverse
mortgage; therefore, the borrowers ability to repay the debt is not an issue.  Nearly
all reverse mortgages are restricted to older borrowers, usually aged 62 and over.
The vast majority of older persons would like to remain in their current homes
for as long as possible.  The AARP found that 92 percent of persons aged 65-74, and
95 percent of those 75 and over, express a desire to age in place.5  With a reverse
mortgage, house-rich, income-poor older homeowners can realize their wish.
                                                
1 One type of reverse mortgage is analyzed herethe Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM)
designed by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).  HECMs are the most widely
available type of reverse mortgage in the U.S. (Section II).
2 Usually, the borrower may select from several disbursement options: lump sum, line-of-credit, and
monthly payments for life or for a specified number of years.
3 As noted by Scholen (1996), forward mortgages may be characterized as falling debt, rising equity,
whereas reverse mortgages may be characterized as the opposite, rising debt, falling equity.
4 The loan may also be terminated if the borrower fails to maintain minimum property standards or to
pay property taxes and homeowners insurance.
5 AARP (2000a), p.24-25.  The percents refer to those respondents who strongly or somewhat agreed
with the statement: What Id really like to do is stay in my current residence for as long as possible.
2I.1. Family ties, the bequest motive, and the demand for reverse mortgages
The perspective of this paper is that both the life-cycle and the bequest motive
theories operate in differing degrees in every household: some homeowners reduce
home equity as they age, and others will leave their homes to heirs.  In areas where
family ties are strong,6 evidence of a bequest motive should be relatively prominent,
and demand for reverse mortgages relatively low.
The further a child lives from a parent, the weaker may be the
intergenerational family ties and any bequest motive on the part of the parent.  In the
aggregate, parents with children living afar are probably less likely than those with
children nearby to be concerned about leaving their homes as a bequest to their
children.  Data on the geographic proximity of children to their parents would
improve any study of the relationship between a bequest motive and the consumption
of housing by older individuals.  Unfortunately, such data are not available.
Of course, a child need not live near a parent to inherit the parents wealth,
including housing wealth.  Nevertheless, parents who own homes may be interested
in transferring the physical property rather than transferring wealth per se.  This
desire is likely to be stronger among parents with children living in the same vicinity
than among those with children living a distance away.  Parents who feel relatively
certain that their children will actually live in the homes they bequeath to them have a
stronger incentive to bequeath their homes than other parents.  Both types of
parentsthose who think that their children would inhabit the inherited home and
those who do notmay or may not possess a bequest motive insofar as financial
wealth is concerned.  The parent with a child nearby, though, is more likely to
bequeath the home because there is a greater chance that the child will inhabit the
home.
Parents derive utility from bequeathing their homes to their children.  The
probability that a parent will bequeath the home increases with the utility a child
receives from the bequest.  The childs utility depends positively not just on the dollar
value of the home, which can be sold and converted to financial wealth, but also on
the value he or she attributes to living in the inherited home (consuming the home).
Both the child living near and the one living afar derive utility from inheriting
the financial wealth represented by the home, but the former derives more of this
wealth utility because disposing of the house would involve greater time and
money costs for the child living afar.  The child who lives near also derives more
utility from consuming the home because he or she is likelier than the child afar to
dwell in it.7  The more distant the child, the larger the disruption caused by the
relocation (the sacrifice of proximity to a job, of a preferred community environment,
etc.) and this lowers the utility derived from moving into the parents home.  Thus,
total utility is expected to be higher for the child living near the parent.  On average,
                                                
6 As discussed in Section I.2, this study also analyzes community ties.  The family and community ties
of the old and young may influence demand for reverse mortgages differently, and so their separate
influences must be evaluated.
7 Even if the child does not intend to live in the parents house, the option to do so would exist.  The
value of this option is greater for the nearby child than for the one living afar.
3parents with children living nearby are likelier than other parents to bequeath their
homes, and hence less likely to be interested in reverse mortgages.
Rasmussen, Megbolugbe and Morgan (1995) point out that reverse mortgages
may be ideal instruments for accommodating inter vivos wealth transfers.  That is, the
transfer of wealth from older homeowners to their children or grandchildren need not
occur only after the homeowners death.  Thus, the authors claim, the desire to leave a
bequest probably will not decreaseand may even increasedemand for reverse
mortgages.
HUD does not systematically collect data on the uses of HECM proceeds,8 so
it is not known how many of the loans are used for inter vivos transfers.  Anecdotal
evidence suggests that the number of HECMs taken out for this purpose is very
small.9  To the extent that HECMs are used to transfer wealth during the lifetimes of
borrowers, the hypothesis that the existence of a bequest motive will decrease the
demand for HECMs is weakened.  However, the argument made above regarding the
desire of older homeowners to transfer physical property continues to be relevant:
however much reverse mortgages may be used to accomplish inter vivos transfers of
financial wealth, they cannot be used to transfer physical propertythat is, the home
itself.  In communities where family ties are strong, the desire to transfer the physical
home is relatively strong, and demand for reverse mortgagesfor whatever
purposeis relatively low.
Since many borrowers apparently first learn about HECMs through their
children or other family members, it might be argued that older homeowners with
children are more likely than childless homeowners to take out a reverse mortgage.10
A similar argument presented for why demand for reverse mortgages might be
positively related to parenthood is that older parents may take out the loans to avoid
being a burden to their children.11  These arguments are flawed.
Would the borrower with children really be more likely than the other
homeowner to take out a HECM?  In order to answer this question properly,
everything else about the two prospective borrowers must be held equalage, home
equity, home value, need for additional monthly income, the strength of their areas
                                                
8 Ken Scholen, founder of the National Center for Home Equity Conversion (NCHEC), and perhaps
the most widely respected authority on reverse mortgages in the U.S., calls the lack of data on the uses
of HECM proceeds the single most disappointing thing about the program. [Personal
communication.]
9 Ken Scholen of NCHEC has encountered a few borrowers who have used reverse mortgages to
make bequests while theyre still alive so they can enjoy the process. [Personal communication.]
Scholens guess is that the majority of HECMs are used to pay off existing mortgages (thereby
increasing monthly income), to make home repairs or improvements, or to prepare for unexpected
financial emergencies.  Analyzing borrower feedback from participants in a focus group, HUD (2000,
p.83) finds that the goal of most participants [for taking out the HECM] was to remain independent
and to enjoy the same quality of life to which they had been accustomed.  (Only 34 borrowers
participated in the focus group, so this claim must be regarded as tentative.)
10 Venessa White, vice president of BNY Mortgage Co., said in a personal communication that often,
children are the ones who push for reverse mortgages.  HUDs (2000) focus-group analysis finds that
while some children bring HECMs to their parents attention, others regret their parents decisions to
take out these loans.
11 As Rasmussen, Megbolugbe and Morgan (1995) suggest.
4family ties, and so on.  The only possible differences between the two would be that
the one with children: (1) has a bequest motive; (2) may be more likely to have heard
about HECMs because of a wider informational network; (3) may not want to be a
burden to the children; and (4) may be able to rely on the children for financial and
other support.  In order for one to conclude that the parent with children would indeed
be more likely than the other to take out a HECM, points (2) and (3) would have to
weigh more than points (1) and (4).  There is no reason to expect that this would be
the case.
I.2. Out-migration matrix
Data on individual households showing the proximity of the householders
children, the strength of the households intergenerational ties, and whether or not the
householder has taken out a HECM are not available.  Instead, data on the family and
community ties and HECM activity of different metropolitan-area counties in the
United States are analyzed.  The primary measures of family and community ties used
here relate to the out-migration of old and young residents.  Out-migration is defined
as a move from the county to a location beyond the metropolitan area.12
Taken together, a high (low) incidence of out-migration of the young and the
old indicates a general weakness (strength) of the areas family and community ties.
Each category of out-migration (old and young) must be analyzed separately because
they influence demand for reverse mortgages in different ways.
High out-migration of young persons means that their ties to the community
and to family members remaining there are weak.  Relative to areas where young out-
migration is low, high young out-migration is expected to increase demand for
reverse mortgages because old homeowners in the community will be less
constrained by a bequest motive.  Low out-migration of the young has the opposite
effect on demand.
High out-migration by older persons indicates that their ties to the community
and to family members there are weak; however, the effect upon demand for reverse
mortgages is different than in the case of high young out-migration.  As with the
young, weak family ties among the old are expected to increase demand.  In contrast
to the young, the weakness of the community ties of the old decreases demand.  The
reason is simple: old residents who plan to move will not be interested in reverse
mortgages, which are relevant only to persons who want to remain in their homes.
This would be true even if the family ties of the old were weak, since the older
homeowners would want to move out of their current communities because of weak
community ties.
The interpretation of a low incidence of old out-migration is somewhat more
problematic.  On the one hand, low old out-migration suggests that the old are
strongly attached to their community; thus, demand for reverse mortgages might be
relatively high.  On the other hand, low out-migration implies that the ties of older
                                                
12 The definition of a metropolitan area as a cluster of counties is discussed further in Section IV.
5persons to family members in the area are strong, which would increase the power of
a bequest motive for holding home equity, and therefore would decrease demand for
reverse mortgages.  By simultaneously accounting for the degree of young out-
migration, these conflicting implications of how a low incidence of old out-migration
might influence demand are resolved, as the following discussion shows.
Figure 1 is a matrix identifying four counties: A, B, C and D.  Consistent with
the definition of out-migration used in this study, the matrix refers to movers from a
given county to a location beyond that countys metropolitan area.  A boldfaced, all
capitals YOUNG means that out-migration of young persons is low, and a
lowercase young means that young out-migration is high.  Similar meanings apply
to OLD and old.
County A (OLD, YOUNG) is characterized by low out-migration of both
young and old.  The low young out-migration has a negative influence on demand for
reverse mortgages.  The effect of the low old out-migration, though, is ambiguous.
Demand for reverse mortgages in County A, however, is clearly lower than in
County B (OLD, young).  There is low old out-migration in County B, just as in
County A.  In County B, however, there is high out-migration of the young.  As a
result, the bequest motive is less prevalent in County B than in County A.  Even
though the old in Counties A and B are equally attached to their communities (and to
family members still there), those in County A are more constrained by a bequest
motive, and therefore less likely to be interested in reverse mortgages.  Thus, demand
for reverse mortgages is higher in County B than in County A.
Demand is also higher in County B than in County C, which is most easily
seen by observing that demand in County A is higher than in County C.  Both
counties (A and C) have low young out-migration, but County C (old, YOUNG) has
a high incidence of old out-migration.  The old homeowners in County C, then, are
less likely than those in County A to desire reverse mortgages because they are more
likely to want to move.  Since, as already shown, demand is higher in County B than
in County A, the fact that demand is higher in A than in C implies that it is higher in
B than in C.
Demand is also higher in County B than in D (old, young).  Both counties
exhibit a high degree of young out-migration.  The difference is that in County D,
there is also a high incidence of old out-migration.  Relative to D, old homeowners in
B want to remain in their communities, despite the fact that young out-migration is
high.  As a result, homeowners in B will be more interested in reverse mortgages than
those in D.
The goal of this study is to test whether or not it is true that demand for
reverse mortgages is higher in counties similar to B than in other counties.  This
requires that the incidence of old and young out-migration both be included in the
analysis.
Two other indicators of the strength of a countys family ties are included in
this study: the percent of residents who belong to a religious denomination, and the
percent who were born in the countys state.  These are discussed in more detail in
Section IV, as are other variables not relating specifically to family or community
ties, but which may influence demand for reverse mortgages.  These include race,
6education, and the degree to which the reverse mortgage market is developed in the
countyas suggested by the per capita13 number of active reverse mortgage lenders
and counselors.14
Before discussing these data and the method of analysis, the main types of
reverse mortgages available in the U.S. are briefly described, followed by a closer
look at the one analyzed herethe HUD-designed HECM.
II. Types of Reverse Mortgages
There are three major types of private reverse mortgages [Table 1]: (1) the
HECM, initiated in 1989 by HUD and insured by the Federal Housing Administration
(FHA); (2) the Home Keeper reverse mortgage, designed and backed by the Federal
National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), initiated in 1995; and (3) Financial
Freedom Senior Funding Corporations (FFSFCs) Cash Account Plan, a proprietary,
non-federally insured loan available in a limited number of states.  The currently
limited geographic availability makes it unsuitable for the purposes of this study.
The HECMs share of the private reverse mortgage market80 to 90
percentfar exceeds that of the other two.15  As with the Home Keeper and FFSFCs
Cash Account, the minimum eligible age for a HECM borrower is 62.  HUD data on
the number of HECMs sold by county, lender, and year are analyzed in this study.16
The borrower may use the proceeds of a private reverse mortgage for any
purpose.  Public sector reverse mortgages, in contrast, are single-purpose loans.
There are two types of public sector loans [Table 1]: deferred payment loans (DPLs)
and property tax deferrals (PTDs).  Both are restricted to low- or moderate-income
households.  DPLs are available from local government agencies and may only be
used to pay for home repair or improvements.  State- and local-government-
sponsored PTDs must be used to offset property taxes.  Public sector reverse
mortgages are more numerous than private reverse mortgages, but their dollar
amounts are almost always much lower.17
                                                
13 As discussed in Section IV, these measures are adjusted for the number of homeowners who are
potential buyers of reverse mortgages in an area (referred to as potential demand).  The term per
capita here refers to these adjustments.
14 As explained below, borrowers of the type of reverse mortgage analyzed here are required to obtain
third-party  (non-lender) counseling.
15 According to Roger Reynolds [personal communication], vice chairman of Wells Fargo Home
Mortgage, Inc. and member of the National Reverse Mortgage Lenders Associations board of
directors, HECMs represent about 90 percent of all reverse mortgages originated by private lenders in
the United States.  Tom Scabareti [personal communication], vice president of marketing at FFSFC,
estimates the HECMs market share at 80 to 85 percent, Home Keepers share at five percent, and
FFSFCs Cash Account Plan at 10 to 15 percent.
16 Fannie Mae does not make data on its Home Keeper available to the public. [Quercia (1997), p.202,
fn.2.]
17Scholen (1996), Ch.18.
7Reverse mortgages have several factors in common.  The loan is due and
payable in full only when the borrower moves, sells the home, or dies.18  Compound
interest accrues on the outstanding balance.  The maximum loan for which a borrower
is eligible depends on the value of the home, the interest rate charged on the loan, and
the expected term of the loan, which is based on the borrowers life expectancy.19
                                                
18  At one time, at least one proprietary lender offered a type of reverse mortgage that did not have to
be repaid if the borrower movedthis was Household Senior Services Household Plan.  Some
reverse mortgages are fixed-term loans, which became due and payable after a specified number of
years.
19 The calculation of the maximum loan amount is based on the borrowers age-based life expectancy
(the expected term).  The longer the life expectancy, the lower the loan amount. Depending on how
long the borrower actually lives and remains in the home, the actual term of the loan will be different
from the expected term.  Only the age of the borrower is used to determine the expected remaining
years of life.  Other factors such as health status, race, and sex are not considered.
8III. The Home Equity Conversion Mortgage20
The first HECM was closed in October 1989,21 two years after Congress
mandated that the HECM Insurance Demonstration be initiated.  Many federal and
quasi-federal agencies, advocacy groups, financial institutions, and other interested
parties were involved in the design of the HECM program.  Besides an interoffice
working group created by HUD, these included Fannie Mae, the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation, the AARP, the National Center for Home Equity Conversion
(NCHEC), the American Bar Associations Commission on Legal Problems of the
Elderly, state housing finance agencies, the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services Administration on Aging, lenders, private mortgage insurers, housing
counselors, area agencies on aging, and other public interest groups.22
Consumer advocacy groupsespecially the NCHEC and AARPwere the
driving forces behind the initiation of the HECM program.  Industry representatives,
HUD, and other federal agencies had to be dragged, kicking and screaming into
accepting the idea of a federal reverse mortgage program, and the advocacy groups
did the dragging.23
For years leading up to Congressional inquiries into a federally supported
program, massive efforts by consumer advocates and others to generate interest
among private insurers failed.24  Insurers of reverse mortgages are exposed to a
variety of risks.  From a lenders perspective, there is tenure risk (the uncertain length
of residency by the borrower), appreciation risk (the uncertain property appreciation
rates), and loan balance risk (the uncertainty of the future amount of the loan
balance).25  The borrower faces the risk that the lender will not make promised loan
disbursements (default risk).26  Evaluating the combination of these risks and deriving
                                                
20This section has relied on several sources.  HUD (1990), (1992), (1995b), (2000); Scholen  (1998);
and AARP (2000b) all provide fairly detailed, sometimes overlapping information on the general
features of the HECM program including borrower eligibility, mandatory counseling, eligible
properties, and the calculation of payments to borrowers.  Since federal and state laws and HUD
regulations relating to HECMs are ever changing, the older publications are in some ways obsolete,
although they sometimes contain details that the others do not.
A wealth of information on HECMs and other types of reverse mortgages is also available
from several websites, including those maintained by AARP <http://www.aarp.org/revmort/>, the
National Center for Home Equity Conversion <http://www.reverse.org/>, and the National Reverse
Mortgage Lenders Association <http://www.reversemortgage.org/links.htm>.
21HUD (1992), p.1-7.
22 HUD (1990).
23 Ken Scholen [personal communication].  That consumer advocacy groups were strongly in favor of
establishing some type of federal reverse mortgage program is evident from their testimonies before
Congress [for example, U.S. Congress, House, (1984) and U.S. Congress, Joint Briefing (1985)].
24 Ken Scholen [personal communication].
25 Loan balance risk stems both from uncertain future interest rates and uncertain cash disbursements to
the borrower (for example, it is not known when a borrower of a line-of-credit HECM will withdraw
funds, or how much the withdrawals will be).
26 U.S. Congress, Joint Briefing (1985), testimony by Maurice D. Weinrobe, Department of
Economics, Clark University.
9appropriate pricing mechanisms proved too large an obstacle to private insurers.27
Without a federally supported reverse mortgage insurance program, it is unlikely that
the market would have developed very extensively.
The FHA-insured HECM program was created partly as a laboratory in
which the special risks associated with reverse mortgages could be evaluated.28
Besides attracting private insurers, it was hoped also that the federal program would
increase the involvement of private originators, servicers, and investors.29
Fifty FHA-approved lenders, each permitted to sell 50 HECMs, were selected
by lottery at the initiation of the program.  Originally, HUD was authorized to insure
2,500 HECMs through September 1991.  A 1990 change in the law expanded the
program: the number of authorized HECMs was increased to 25,000 through 1995
and all FHA-approved lenders were allowed to participate.30  In 1998, the program
became permanent, and allowable outstanding loans were increased to 150,000.31  By
the end of year 2000, FHA had insured a total of 44,418 HECMs.32
The HECM program is specifically intended:
to meet the special needs of elderly homeowners by
reducing the effect of the economic hardship caused by
the increasing costs of meeting health, housing, and
subsistence needs at a time of reduced income . . . .33
To be eligible for a HECM, the prospective borrower must be age 62 or
over.34  HUD may, at its discretion, set a higher age.35  Had HUD prescribed a higher
age to account for the fact that HECMs should appeal most to older homeowners (as
discussed below), it is possible that lenders could have marketed the HECM more
efficiently.36  By selecting age 62, however, more prospective borrowers learn about
HECMs.  Even if the younger homeowners learn that the proceeds they can get from
                                                
27 Ken Scholen [personal communication].  According to Scholen, who was heavily involved in
discussions with private insurers, the insurers were uncomfortable with the radical nature of reverse
mortgages.  Property [insurers] knew about appreciation risk, but not about mortality risk [the
uncertainty associated with the borrowers life expectancy], he said, and [insurers who knew about]
mortality werent sure about tenure or property risk.
28 Ken Scholen [personal communication].
29 HUD (2000), p.32.
30HUD (1992), p.1-2.
31HUD (2000).
32 Based on data obtained from HUD.
33 U.S. Code, Title 12, §1715z-20(a).
34 When a couple takes out a reverse mortgage, the youngest borrower must be age 62 or over.  There
are no restrictions on the number of signatories with a HECM: Three sisters or four friends would be
as eligible as a single individual or a couple, assuming that they are all 62 year[s] of age or older and
are all owners of the residence . . . but, in each case, [the amount of the loan] would be based on the
age of the youngest borrower. [HUD (1990), p.4-3].
35 U.S. Code, Title 12, §1715z-20(b).
36 Persons at younger ages often discover after visiting and spending time with lenders (and with
counselors) that the amount of the loan for which they qualify is too low to warrant taking out a
HECM. [Ken Scholen (personal communication).]  In such cases, the time spent by the lender
educating the prospective borrower goes unrewarded.
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a HECM are currently too low to be worthwhile, they may decide, based on the
information they gathered during their initial inquiries, that the loan might be useful
later, or that it might benefit someone else they know.37
Eligible properties include owner-occupied 1- to 4-family homes,
manufactured homes built after June 1976, condominiums, and dwellings that are part
of Planned Unit Developments.  The law was amended in December 2000 to extend
eligibility to cooperative housing units.38
Among the costs borne by the HECM borrower [Table 2] is mortgage
insurance, the premiums of which are collected by the FHA.  The insurance not only
protects the borrower from the risk of lender default, but also protects the lender from
the crossover risk that the loan balance will exceed the value of the home when the
loan becomes due and payable.39  All types of reverse mortgages provide that the
amount owed cannot exceed the value of the home at the time the loan becomes
payable.  The value of the home might be less than the loan balance if the borrower
lives in the home for longer than expected, if interest rates rise unexpectedly over the
life of the loan, or if the home appreciates too slowly.40  Other costs that must be paid
by the borrower include origination fees, closing costs, servicing fees,41 and interest.
These costs may be paid for with the proceeds of the loanthat is, the borrower is
not required to have the cash necessary to pay for these costs up front.
HUD requires that the interest rate charged on adjustable-rate HECMs must
be equal to the one-year, constant maturity Treasury security index plus a lenders
margin.42  Currently, Fannie Mae is the secondary market buyer of virtually all
HECMs.43  Fannie Mae determines the lenders margin that must be applied to
HECMs it will purchase;44 thus, all mortgagees charge the same interest on newly
originated HECMs.  Mortgagees could, if they wished, charge a higher lenders
margin than that set by Fannie Mae, but then Fannie Mae would not invest in their
HECMs.  Although, theoretically, mortgagees could charge a lower margin and still
sell their HECMs to Fannie Mae, this is very unlikely to occur in practice.  The
profitability of HECMs is already lowbelow that of conventional forward
mortgagesand market activity is modest.  Charging lower interest than the Fannie
Mae standard would almost certainly result in lower profits because it is unlikely that
                                                
37 Ken Scholen [personal communication].  All the thoughts in this paragraph are his.
38 National Reverse Mortgage Lenders Association website <http://www.reversemortgage.org>
(accessed February 20, 2001).
39Discussions of crossover risk and its relationship to insurance risk and borrower payments may be
found in Szymanoski (1990) and Chinloy and Megbolugbe (1994).
40 HUD (2000).
41 Servicing HECMs includes maintaining data on monthly loan activity, providing borrowers with
periodic loan statements, certifying occupancy and property maintenance, changing borrower payment
plans, accepting mortgage repayments, declaring the mortgage due and payable, and many other tasks.
[Fannie Mae (2000)].
42 HUD (1994).
43 HUD (2000), pp.50-51.
44 Fannie Mae (2000).
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loan volume would increase enoughif it increased at allto offset the reduced
revenue generated by each HECM originated.45
To date, only a few small lendersoriginating altogether a trivial number of
loanshave chosen to retain their HECM assets rather than sell them to Fannie
Mae.46  (Whether the lenders margins on their loans differ from those of other
HECM originators is not known.)  Capital constraints may reduce the willingness of
lenders to hold HECMs or other types of reverse mortgages in their portfolios.47
Unlike forward mortgages, where monthly cash inflows from the borrower begin
approximately one month after the debt is originated, cash inflows from reverse
mortgagesone-time, lump-sum repaymentsusually occur only after several years.
In November 2001, the Fannie Mae lenders margins were 1.50 percentage
points for monthly adjustable loans and 2.10 points for annually adjusted loans.48
Very few fixed-rate HECMs, which are also permitted by HUD, have been originated
because Fannie Mae will not purchase them.
The borrower may elect to receive the HECM loan as a single lump-sum, as a
line-of-credit (that grows over time), as a monthly cash advance for a fixed period
(term loan), as a monthly cash advance for as long as the borrower lives in the
home (tenure loan), or as any combination of lump sum, credit line, or monthly
cash advance.  The borrower has the right to change the method of loan disbursement
at any time.
As with all reverse mortgages, the maximum loan allowable with a HECM
depends positively on the age of the borrower and the value of the home, and
negatively on the interest rate applied to the loan.49  With the interest rate, home
value, and other factors givensuch as race, sex, and household incomethe appeal
of a reverse mortgage should increase with the age of the homeowner, as older
borrowers will receive larger cash outlays.50  The age-based life expectancy of the
borrower is used to estimate the life of the loan when it is originated.  Cash outlays to
older borrowers are expected to be of shorter duration, and so can be larger in dollar
amount to achieve any given loan balance.
Female general population mortality tables are used for all borrowers to
determine loan payments under the HECM program.51  Federal law prohibiting
discrimination against loan applicants on the basis of sex means that gender-specific
mortality tables cannot be used to determine HECM payments.52  (The same law
covers discrimination by race).  In designing the HECM, HUD chose to use the
female mortality tables instead of blended tables, which would have been allowable
                                                
45 Venessa White, vice president of BNY Mortgage Co. [personal communication].
46 HUD (2000), p.50, fn.29.
47 Tom Atwell, senior business manager for senior products at the Single-Family Marketing division of
Fannie Mae [personal communication].
48 Adjustments are linked to changes in the one-year Treasury index.
49 For a detailed analysis of how HECM payments are determined, see Szymanoski (1990).
50 HUD (1995b).
51 HUD (1990). With multiple signatories, payments are based on the age of the youngest borrower.
52 U.S. Code, Title 15, §1691(a).
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under the law, partly because a large majority of borrowers [were] expected to be
female.53
Given their lower age-based life expectancies [Table 3], males essentially get
a worse deal from HECMs than do females.  For example, with a tenure loan, males
will receive the same payments as females, but for fewer years (on average).  Insofar
as the HECM design should be more appealing to females than to males, HUDs
expectation that a high percent of borrowers would be females is at least partly self-
fulfilling.  As Table 4 shows, females living alone represent a much higher percent of
HECM borrowers (56.3% in 1999) than they do of all older homeowners  (29.6% in
1997).54
As whites have higher life expectancies than blacks55 [Table 3], the HECM is
basically a better bargain for them.  Thus, it might be expected that whites would
represent a higher percent of HECM borrowers than they do of all older homeowners,
and that the opposite would be true of blacks.  This was generally true earlier in the
HECM program [Table 4], but not later.  Whites made up 92.7 percent of HECM
borrowers in 1995 (compared to 87.2% of all homeowners), but only 86.4 percent in
1999.  Meanwhile, the percent of HECM borrowers who are black rose from 5.9 to
9.2 (7.8% of all older homeowners are black).
It is possible that more effective marketing of the HECM product to minorities
than to whites may explain the shift in racial composition.  Lenders receive an
implicit reward for marketing HECMs to minorities.  Fannie Mae, which invests in
virtually all HECMs sold, must meet minimum income-based and geographically
targeted housing goals when purchasing mortgages.  One of the geographically
targeted goals relates to properties located in census tracts within metropolitan areas
where . . . minorities comprise 30 percent or more of the residents and the median
income of families does not exceed 120 percent of the area median income.56
HECMs that are sold to borrowers in such areas may be easier to re-sell to Fannie
Maeif not now, when market activity is fairly low and when the ability to re-sell is
not a real concern, then perhaps when market activity expands.  Lenders subject to
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) requirements may also target minorities, since
HECMs qualify for CRA credit.57
Besides race and ethnicity, Table 4 compares other characteristics of HECM
borrowers to all other older homeowners.  As expected, the average HECM borrower
tends to be older than the average of all older homeowners.  (The gap is wider than
suggested in Table 4, since the total group of older homeowners is aged 65 and over,
compared to 62 and over for the HECM group.)
                                                
53 HUD (1990), p.5-2.
54 In Table 4, the figures for all homeowners are for 1997 (except for income (1995)), whereas the
figures for HECM borrowers are for 1995 and 1999.  Using the 1997 figures instead of the 1995 and
1999 figures for all homeowners [available in U.S. Census Bureau (1997) and (2001)] facilitates the
comparison to HECM borrowers without affecting the conclusions reached in the text.
55 The data refer to non-Hispanic white and black persons.  Hispanics may be of any race.
56 HUD (1996), p.23.
57 HUD (1995b), p.3-5.
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Table 4 also shows that the median income of HECM borrowers is below that
of other older homeowners; however, HUD (2000) warns that the data underlying this
figure are not reliable.58  It is possible that lower income homeowners are in greater
need of converting their home equity into cash in order to meet daily living expenses,
medical bills, etc.
HUD (1995b) reported that HECM borrowers had an average of 0.59 children,
but the data underlying this statistic were later determined to be unreliable.59  It is
reasonable to assume that the average number of children among HECM borrowers is
lower than the average among non-borrowers since older homeowners with children
are likelier than those without children to avoid reverse mortgages (because of a
higher bequest motive).60
The median appraised property value tends to be greater among HECM
borrowers ($107,000 for all loans closed 1989-1999) than among all older
homeowners ($87,000 in 1997).61  The percent of HECMs taken out by residents of
central cities (41.3%) is much higher than the percent of all older homeowners who
live there (24.1%).  In contrast, the percent of HECM borrowers who reside in non-
metropolitan areas (11.8%) is lower than the corresponding percent of all older
homeowners (18.7%).62
                                                
58 A later tabulation of the data revealed many cases where values were zero or missing.
59 As with the income data, a later analysis revealed a high percent of missing or zero values.  The zero
values for number of children could indicate either that the value is indeed zero or that the respondent
did not supply the information.




IV. Data and Method of Analysis
IV.1. Method of analysis
The method of ordinary least squares (OLS) is used to test whether the
strength of an areas family ties influences the demand for HECMs.  To address the
possible endogeneity of one of the regressors (LENDERS),  a two-stage least squares
(TSLS) regression is also performed.
The unit of analysis is a county in one of 26 selected metropolitan areas in the
United States (Table 5).  Counties are included within a metropolitan area by the U.S.
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) when there are strong social and economic
linkages between the counties and a populous core area.63  This study follows the
1990 metropolitan area definitions.
Appendix A describes all the variables and their expected signs.  Summary
statistics of the variables are provided in Table 6.64
IV.2. Dependent variable
The dependent variable, HECM9000, is the number of FHA-endorsed HECMs
purchased over a ten-year period (1990-2000) by borrowers residing in the county,
divided by potential demand for reverse mortgages in the county, times 1,000.65  In
other words, HECM9000 is the number of HECMs purchased per 1,000 units of
potential demand over a ten-year period.
IV.3. Potential demand for reverse mortgages
Several studies conducted in the past decade attempted to estimate the
potential demand for reverse mortgages.  To my knowledge, this study is the first to
attempt to explain actual demand for reverse mortgages, and to relate actual demand
to potential demand.
                                                
63The OMB analyzes the level of commuting to jobs between a county and a central city to determine
whether to include that county in a metropolitan area.  Counties are convenient building blocks of
metropolitan areas both because county boundaries do not change and because of the prevalence of
countywide data. [McDonald, 1997, pp.4-5.  See U.S. Census Bureau (2000), Appendix II, for a
detailed discussion of the OMB standards.]
64 Data sources are listed just prior to the list of references at the end of the paper.
65 According to both Ken Scholen of the NCHEC and Venessa White of BNY Mortgage Co., all but a
trivial number of lenders charged the same interest rates on HECMs throughout this period.  Earlier in
the HECM program, when a few investors besides Fannie Mae were active in the secondary market for
HECMs, an insignificant number of lenders may have sold HECMs at interest rates different from
those required by Fannie Mae.  For the past several years, Fannie Mae has been the only active
investor in HECMs.  Thus, there is no need to correct for interest rate differences across lenders when
analyzing demand.
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Researchers have estimated the number (or proportion) of households with
characteristics they considered representative of potential interest in reverse
mortgages.  In general, potentially interested homeowners are those who are very old,
have high housing equity, and receive low incomes.  The underlying idea is that
households that can increase their cash flows substantially through a reverse
mortgage will have relatively high interest in these loans.
Varying estimates have been derived based on different assumptions about
which income level, housing valuation, and age of householder should be used to
indicate potential demand.  Merrill, Finkel, and Kutty (1994) use the 1989 American
Housing Survey to estimate a lower bound of potential demand in the U.S. equal to
800,000 households.  This was the number of householders in 1989 aged 70 and over
who had lived in their homes for more than 10 years, with annual income of $30,000
or less, and with home equity between $100,000 and $200,000.66
Defining potential demand as equal to the number of homeowners aged 62
and over who could increase their monthly income by 20% or more with a reverse
mortgage, Mayer and Simons (1994) estimate potential demand at six million
households (1990).  The authors estimates are based on an analysis of the Census
Bureaus 1990 Survey of Income and Program Participation.
Kutty (1998) uses data from the 1991 American Housing Survey, and finds
that 621,000 homeowners aged 65 and over could have been raised above the poverty
level in 1991 if they would have obtained a reverse mortgage.  This represented 29
percent of all poor householders aged 65 and over in that year.
Rasmussen, Megbolugbe and Morgan (1995) use the U.S. Census Public Use
Microdata Sample (5%) to derive an estimate of 6.7 million homeowners aged 70 and
over with $30,000 or more in home equity (in 1989).  These homeowners compose
what the authors call the primary market for reverse mortgages.  The authors
estimates suggest that an additional 4.4 million homeowners aged 62-69 would have
entered the primary market group by 1998, bringing total potential demand in the
United States to 11 million.
In addition to estimating potential demand for the entire U.S., Rasmussen,
Megbolugbe and Morgan (1995) also estimate potential demand for selected
metropolitan areas.  A weighted average of their metropolitan area estimates was used
to derive this studys county-level figures.  The weights are based on the percent of a
metropolitan areas homeowners aged 75 and over who reside in each county (1990
data).67
Rasmussen, Megbolugbe and Morgan argue that reverse mortgages should be
viewed as tools not only for smoothing consumption over time, as predicted by the
                                                
66 Householders with equity above $200,000 were excluded because the authors thought they are
more likely to have other assets and may not want a reverse mortgage. [op. cit., pp.279-280].
67 Data on homeowners aged 70 and over were not available, so those aged 75 and over were used.  To
the extent that the distribution across metropolitan areas is different for homeowners aged 75 and over
than it is for those aged 70 and over, the weights are flawed.  My analysis of 1,850 counties, including
the 129 observations in this study, reveals that it is unlikely that the distributions are different
systematically.  Two sums were calculated using 1990 Census population data: one of persons aged
70-74 across the 1,850 counties, and one of those aged 75-79.  The percents of these totals represented
by each county were then determined.  The correlation between the two percents is 0.998.
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life-cycle hypothesis, but also as asset management tools.  In their view, the ability
to alter the composition of wealthfrom illiquid to liquid assetsis an attractive
feature of reverse mortgages for prospective borrowers at all income levels.  Hence,
unlike other researchers, they do not consider income in their estimate of potential
demand.  Restricting an estimation of potential demand to homeowners whose loan
proceeds would represent a large percent of their monthly incomes entails making
an arbitrary choice of what loan-to-income figure to use as a threshold.  This
restriction ignores the asset-management feature of reverse mortgages.
Insofar as it is calculated without being truncated at some arbitrary income
threshold, Rasmussen, Megbolugbe and Morgans estimate represents an upper bound
of potential demand for reverse mortgages.  In my study, estimation of actual demand
is adjusted for this upper-bound measure of potential demand.68
IV.4. Independent variables in OLS
As discussed in Section I, the principal measures of the strength of a countys
family and community ties that are used in this study are two relating to out-
migrationout-migration of the young (Y_OUT), and out-migration of the old
(OLD_OUT).  These variables refer to the percent of residents of a certain age who
moved from a county to a location beyond that countys metropolitan area during the
1985-1990 period.
OLD_OUT is the percent of all residents aged 60-79 in 1985 that out-migrated
by 1990.  In 1990, the beginning of the 1990-2000 period over which HECM loan
activity is analyzed in this study, this cohort would have been aged 65-84.  HUD
(2000) reports that about three-fourths of HECMs purchased through the year 1999
were by persons in this age group.  The midpoint of this age group is approximately
equal to the median age of all HECM borrowers (75).
The percent of residents out-migrating in one period is probably serially
correlated with the percent in previous periods.  For example, if the 1985-1990
percent was high, then a high percent of the pool of older homeowners living in the
county in 1990 probably plan to move.  (Out-migration data analyzed here are from
1985-1990; data on HECM loan activity are from 1990-2000.)  If they plan to move,
then they will not want a HECM.  Thus, the expected sign of this coefficient is
negative.69
Y_OUT is the percent of people aged 25-39 in 1985 who moved out of the
metropolitan area by 1990.  Those younger than 25 were not selected in order to
avoid including individuals of primary college age, who may move temporarily to
attend college before returning home.  The expected sign of Y_OUT is positive
because a high percent reflects weak family ties among the young and a weak
                                                
68 As mentioned, analysis in this paper is at the county level, and Rasmussen, Megbolugbe and
Morgans estimates for selected metropolitan are used to derive potential demand for each county.
69 Section I.2 provides a detailed discussion of how OLD_OUT and Y_OUT are expected to influence
demand.
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attachment to the community, reducing any bequest motive among the old
homeowners in the area.
Other variables used to measure the strength of a countys family ties are
RELIGION and BORN_IN.
RELIGION is the percent of residents who belong to a religious denomination.
By including this variable, the aphorism The family that prays together, stays
together, is taken seriously.  When RELIGION is high, intergenerational bonds are
thought to be relatively strong.  The expected sign of RELIGION is negative.
BORN_IN is the percent of the countys population who were born in the
same state as their current residence.  When BORN_IN is high, it increases the
likelihood that multiple generations of the same family live in the county.  As a
consequence, demand for reverse mortgages is expected to be relatively low.
BORN_IN is expected to be negative.
Two other independent variables are included in the regressions: WHITE and
ED.  These variables do not relate specifically to family ties, but may influence
demand for HECMs for other reasons.
WHITE is the percent of the population who are white.  As discussed in
Section III, they have a higher average life expectancy than do non-whites, so the
HECM is basically a better deal for them.  As a result, it is possible that demand
among whites will be greater than among non-whites, so the expected sign of WHITE
is positive.
Whites as a group could have stronger or weaker family ties than non-whites.
If family ties among whites are generally weaker, then WHITE would still be
expected to have a positive impact upon demand for HECMs.  However, if ties
among whites are stronger, then WHITE could be negative.
ED is the percent of residents aged 25 and over who have graduated from
college.  The expected sign of ED is positive because it is assumed that persons with
higher educational status are more sophisticated (on average) when it comes to
financial investments, and better able to judge the costs and benefits of financial
instruments, especially those as complex as reverse mortgages.70
It is well known that educational achievement and income are highly,
positively correlated.  (For the 129 counties in this study, the simple correlation
between ED and the counties median income [INCOME] equals 0.5909 [Table 7].)
Thus, in the regressions reported here, the coefficient on ED picks up some of the
effect of INCOME.  As discussed below, INCOME is used as an instrument for
LENDERS, which is possibly endogenous.
Previously, it was mentioned that the demand for HECMs possibly might be
negatively related to income. Theoretically, excluding INCOME from the regressions
may create biased estimators; however, an analysis of regressions that were run with
and without INCOME reveals that neither the coefficients nor the statistical
                                                
70 When ED is high, the percent of older persons (that is, those eligible for HECMs) who are highly
educated is assumed to be high also.  A similar assumption is made regarding WHITE.
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significance of the remaining regressors are substantially altered.71  For this reason,
but especially because INCOME is considered a fairly good instrument for
LENDERS, the variable is excluded from the regressions (except as an instrument).
Two measures of the degree to which the HECM market is developed
LENDERS and COUNSMSAare included among the explanatory variables.  These
variables are included to account for variation across observations in the availability
of HECMs, the intensity with which they are marketed, and the ease with which
prospective borrowers may obtain correct information about them.
The first measure of market development relates to HECM counseling.  To
ensure that they understand the full impact of tapping into home equity,72
prospective borrowers are required by law to obtain counseling from a HUD-
approved housing counseling agency before they can take out a HECM.  A party
other than the lender must provide the counseling.  To prevent conflicts of interest, it
is unlawful for counselors to charge a fee for referring a prospective borrower to a
lender.73
Advocates for older persons, lenders, and others involved in developing the
HECM program generally agree that counseling is warranted both because of the
newness and complexity of the loans, and because of [t]he vulnerability of many
elderly households.74  Some prospective borrowers resent the mandatory counseling
as paternalistic.75  Others who had counseling and then decided to take out a HECM
complained later that they were not aware of the full costs of [the] loans and would
not have chosen a HECM if they had been better informed of other options.76
                                                
71 Nor is the overall explanatory power of the regressions much affected by excluding INCOME.  In
fact, the adjusted R-square tends to increase slightly without INCOME.  In the regressions where
INCOME is included, it is not statistically significant.
72 HUD (1995b), p.4-1.
73 HUD (2000).  Conflicts of interest may exist nevertheless.  A majority of counseling agencies
interviewed by HUD reported that lenders refer all or most of the prospective HECM borrowers who
walk through their doors.  Some borrowers interviewed did not realize that they had even received
counseling, but had thought they were dealing with representatives of the lender.
74 HUD (1992), p.4-1.
75 HUD (1992).
76 HUD (2000), p.78.  As discussed below, HECM counselors are required to discuss the financial
implications of HECMs with the prospective borrower.  Counselors and the prospective borrowers
both must sign a Counselor Certificate certifying that the financial implications and other specific
matters (reviewed below) were discussed in detail.  Thus, prospective borrowers who are unhappy with
the quality of the information provided by counselors have only themselves to blame if they chose to
sign the certificate nevertheless.
Federal Truth-in-Lending law requires that HECM lenders disclose to borrowers the Total
Annual Loan Cost (TALC) of the loans.  This is the annual rate that would generate the outstanding
debt at a specified future date when applied to the cash advances received by the borrower.  (The total
debt includes not only the cash advances and accrued interest, but also origination fees, closing costs,
servicing fees, and insurance premiums [which all accrue interest] financed by the loan.)  The TALC is
considered the best indicator of a HECMs cost, and allows borrowers to compare costs across
different types of reverse mortgages. [Scholen (1996); HUD (2000), pp.92-94.  TALC requirements
are discussed in detail on the NCHEC website, www.reverse.org/info.update.tila.html.]
Some HECM borrowers complain about not understanding the full costs of the loans.  This
is not necessarily a reflection of inadequate counseling, since it is the lenders responsibility to disclose
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Although these complaints suggest that the quality of counseling is not always up to
par (as discussed below, this is well known), they also suggest that mandatory
counseling, when adequate, may not be a bad idea.
The counseling session is intended to help the prospective borrower make an
informed decision about the suitability of a HECM for his or her financial needs and
situation.  In the session, the counselor must discuss (a) the availability to the
homeowner of other housing options (such as selling the home and moving into a
rented apartment),77 social services, and financial resources; (b) other reverse
mortgage programs (such as DPLs and PTDs); (c) the financial implications
associated with HECMs; and (d) the consequences of HECMs on tax status,
eligibility for public benefits, and estate and heirs of the homeowner.78  Whenever
feasible, face-to-face counseling must be provided.  HUD regulations stipulate that
[t]elephone counseling should not even be mentioned as an alternative to the
homeowner unless the possibility of face-to-face counseling has been completely
ruled out.79
COUNSMSA is the number of HUD-approved housing counselors who
offered HECM counseling80 in the countys metropolitan area as of March 2001, per
1,000 units of potential demand in the metropolitan area.81  A high value for
COUNSMSA is interpreted as a relatively high degree of market development.
This measure of market development is imperfect.  As mentioned in footnote
81, not all counties have HECM counselors, and the number of metropolitan-wide
counselors is used to calculate COUNSMSA.  This means that some homeowners in a
metropolitan area will live in the county where counselors are located, and others will
not.  Those living in the same county as the counselors will likely have better access
to counseling services.  Another shortcoming with COUNSMSA is that it does not
account for the quality of the counseling provided, which can vary greatly from one
housing counseling agency to another.82  Lastly, the number of agencies that are
approved by HUD to offer HECM counseling may overstate the number that actually
provide the service.83
The other measure of HECM market development is LENDERS, the number
of financial institutions that have sold (originated) one or more HECMs in a county
                                                                                                                                          
the TALC.  Since there are strict federal guidelines, it is highly unlikely that any lender would fail to
properly disclose TALC rates to borrowers.
77 HUD is vague about the type of housing options that must be discussed with the prospective
borrower.  According to HUDs HECM handbook (for use by HUD personnel, counseling agencies,
and lenders), the counselor must discuss [t]he options other than home equity conversion that are
available to the borrower, including other housing. . . options. [HUD (1994), p. 2-3]
78 HUD (1995a).
79 HUD (1994).
80 HECM counseling is one of several types of counseling that may be offered by HUD-approved
housing counseling agencies.  These include default/foreclosure counseling, rent delinquency
counseling, pre-purchase and pre-rental counseling [HUD (1995a)].
81 Many of the counties analyzed in this study have no HECM counselors.  For this reason, the number
of counselors across the metropolitan area is used.




over a ten-year period (1990-2000), per 1,000 units of potential demand.  The period
1990-2000 captures all mortgagees that have sold HECMs since the inception of the
program except for two sold in 1989.84
Any given financial institution can sell one or more HECMs in a county.  In
six of the 135 counties for which data were obtained, the value of LENDERS is zero;
by definition, HECM9000 must also be zero in these six cases.  These six counties are
excluded from the regressions reported here, leaving 129 observations.
Individual financial institutions may vary greatly in marketing intensity,
managerial skill, and customer satisfaction.  Moreover, LENDERS almost certainly
undercounts the number of institutions that have actually entered the HECM market
in a county, as those that offer the HECM product but fail to sell any are
unobservable in the data.85  As with COUNSMSA, LENDERS should be considered a
crude estimate of market development.
IV.5. Possible endogeneity of lenders
Ceteris paribus, demand for HECMs will be higher in a county where many
financial institutions have entered the HECM market than in a county where few have
entered the market.  Not only are prospective borrowers more likely to have heard
about HECMs in counties where the number of active lenders is relatively high, but
also the transaction costs for obtaining a HECM are probably lower.  Transaction
costs would include gathering information about how HECMs work, locating
financial institutions that offer them, visiting a lender, and comparison-shopping.86
Commercial banks, savings and loans, credit unions, and mortgage
companies87 that choose to offer the HECM product are already in place, and simply
offering a new product to their customers.  It is unlikely that lenders evaluated any of
                                                
84 The HUD data used in this study to calculate LENDERS and HECM9000 show that two HECMs
were sold to residents of Bernalillo County, New Mexico in 1989, a county that is not among the
observations of this study.  However, it is well established that the first HECM was closed in 1989 by
the James B. Nutter Company to a resident of Fairway, Kansas, which is in Johnson County, one of the
counties included in the 129 observations of this study [HUD (1990, p.1-4) and Scholen (1998,
p.115)].  The HUD data erroneously show zero HECMs sold in Johnson County in 1989.  The one sold
in 1989 is almost certainly included in the 1990 data.
85 That is, financial institutions that offered the HECMs but failed to sell any do not appear in the data.
Only lenders that have sold at least one HECM from 1990 through 2000 are included in the data.
86 While interest rates on newly originated HECMs are equal across lenders, origination fees and
closing costs may vary (within limits set by HUD), at least theoretically.  According to Venessa White
of BNY Mortgage Co. [personal communication], providing customer service, rather than adjusting
origination fees and/or closing costs, is the main way that lenders compete for HECM customers.
Differences in origination fees and closing costs across lenders cannot be accounted for in the data.  It
is assumed that, on average, residents across the counties studied are charged the same origination fees
and closing costs.  Comparison-shopping would include evaluating the customer service, origination
fees and closing costs of different lenders.
87 Seventy-five percent of HECMs originated in 1999 were by mortgage companies. [HUD (2000)]
The percent sold by credit unions is very smalldata obtained from HUD show that of the 44,418
HECMs closed through the end of 2000, only 28 were originated by credit unions.
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the independent variables used here when determining whether or not to offer
HECMs in a county.  In addition to wanting to tap into the potentially large and
growing HECM market arising from the impending retirement of the baby boom
generation, one of the main reasons lenders decide to offer HECMs is as a hedge
against demand fluctuations in the conventional forward mortgage market.88  For
example, if demand for forward mortgages falls because of rising unemployment,
then HECM business may offset the consequent reduction in a lenders revenue.
It is assumed that once a financial institution has decided to offer HECMs, its
supply of HECMs is completely responsive to demand.  That is, the institution will
sell as many HECMs as are demanded by borrowers.  Given the very modest numbers
of HECMs sold thus far in the U.S., it is extremely doubtful that lenders are
concerned with putting a cap on the number of HECMs they will originate due to
investment portfolio considerations.  Indeed, some lenders are dropping out of the
HECM program because of low activity.89
In other words, LENDERS is considered exogenous in the OLS regression.
However, to account for the possibility that it is endogenous, a TSLS regression is
also performed, with LENDERS as the instrumented variable.
IV.6. Instruments in TSLS
In the TSLS regression, BANKSthe number of commercial and savings
banks in the county (1995 data) per 1,000 units of potential demandis used as an
instrument for LENDERS.90  It is reasonable to suppose that LENDERS is more likely
to be high when BANKS is high.  The simple correlation between the two variables is
0.47 (Table 7).
Table 7 suggests that two other variablesINCOME and MARRYKIDmay
be good instruments for LENDERS  (simple correlations with LENDERS of 0.40 and
0.65, respectively).  INCOME is the median income of the county, and MARRYKID is
the percent of all households composed of married couples residing with their
children.
It is not unlikely that financial institutions evaluate income and household
composition when making marketing decisions.  High-income areas are likely to
generate greater business activity for financial institutions on both the liability side
(deposits) and asset side (loans) of their balance sheets, and are attractive to these
institutions.  Indeed, the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) was passed to ensure
that depository institutions were meeting the credit needs of the low- and moderate-
                                                
88 HUD (2000), p.33.
89 In 1998 and 1999, for the first time since the initiation of the program, more financial institutions left
the HECM market than entered it.  The decision to leave has been based mainly on a perceived lack of
demand [HUD (2000)].  At least one lender was active in at least one year from 1990-2000 in every
county evaluated in the regressions of this study.
90 The essence of the TSLS technique is that each potentially endogenous right-hand side variable (in
this case, only oneLENDERS) is replaced by a proxy that is assumed to be uncorrelated with the
disturbance.  The proxy is an estimate of the original variable determined by regressing the original on
all exogenous variables, including the instruments. [Greene (1997), Ch.16.]
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income households located in their communities.91  Such protections were not needed
for high-income households.  INCOME is used as an instrument for LENDERS with
the assumption that financial institutions will be drawn to high-income areas.92
As mentioned above (footnote 87), mortgage companies have closed about
three out of every four HECMs sold to date.  Either commercial banks or savings and
loans have sold all but a trivial number of the other 25% of HECMs.  The main
business of savings and loans is making conventional home loans.  Thus, the vast
majority of HECM originators specialize in the residential mortgage market.
Areas where a high percent of households are composed of married couples
with children are probably attractive marketing areas for such financial institutions.
Demand in these areas for the non-reverse-mortgage products they sellhome
purchase loans, refinancing of home loans, and home equity lines of creditmay be
relatively high.  For example, in 1999, nearly 30% of all homeowners were in this
demographic group.93  For these reasons, MARRYKID is used as another instrument
for LENDERS.  Thus, there are three instruments for LENDERS: BANKS, INCOME,
and MARRYKID.
                                                
91 U.S. Code, Title 12, §2901.
92 The CRA does not prevent a depository institution from choosing where to locate; rather, it requires
the institution to meet the credit needs of the entire community (including low- and moderate-income
neighborhoods) in which they do locate.




Table 8 shows all of the regression results: OLS with and without the possibly
endogenous variable LENDERS, and TSLS.  The OLS regression including
LENDERS is reported first, followed by a review of the consequences of excluding
the variable and a discussion of the TSLS findings.
The adjusted R-square (0.235) of the OLS regression including LENDERS
indicates that the overall explanatory power of the model is modest, but this is a
respectable figure for a cross-sectional, small sample-size analysis.  All of the
variables have the correct signs except for COUNSMSA (-3.485) and RELIGION
(0.054).  Neither of these is statistically significant.  The measurement problems of
COUNSMSA that were discussed in Section IV.4 may explain the poor performance
of that variable in the regression.
The other measure of market development, LENDERS, is positive and highly
significant.  Each additional HECM lender that becomes active in an area is predicted
to lead to an increase of HECMs demanded of about 2.3, which represents about 20%
of the mean of the dependent variable HECM9000 (11.44).
WHITE is positive (0.141), as expected, and significant at the five percent
level.94  The regression results also support the hypothesis that education has a
positive influence on HECM demandED is positive (0.346) and significant at the
one percent level.  The percent of persons born in the same state as their current
residence is also found to influence demand.  As expected, BORN_IN is negative (-
0.127), although it meets a lower threshold of statistical significance (10%).
Fairly strong evidence is found supporting the theory that a weak attachment
to their community by the old (OLD_OUT is high) will result in a relatively low
demand for reverse mortgages.  The coefficient on OLD_OUT equals -1.29.  When
the percent of old persons that out-migrate increases by one (or by about 16% of
OLD_OUTs mean of 6.1), then the number of HECMs sold in an area is estimated to
decline by 1.29, or by about 11% of the mean of HECM9000.  OLD_OUT is
significant at the one percent level.
Weak family and community ties among the young are found to increase
demand for reverse mortgages.  Y_OUT is highly significant (1% level) and positive
(0.767).  A one-unit increase in Y_OUTseven percent of its mean (14.86)is
predicted to increase demand for HECMs by 0.767 (approximately seven percent).
Approximating at the means, the elasticity of demand with respect to young out-
migration is equal to one.  The elasticity of demand with respect to old out-migration
is higher at about 1.5.
The OLS results provide rather strong support for the theory that an areas
family and community ties influence demand for reverse mortgages.  This implies
                                                
94 Hereinafter, all analyses of statistical significance refer to one-tailed tests.
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that a bequest motive among old homeowners has an effect on their decisions
regarding whether or not to take out these loans.
V.1.B. OLSLENDERS excluded
As discussed in Section IV.5, LENDERS is possibly endogenous.  A more
rigorous accounting of this possibility is given in Section V.2, where TSLS results are
presented.  It is interesting to compare the results from excluding LENDERS from the
OLS estimation with those described above, where LENDERS was included.
The only noteworthy change is that COUNSMSA is negative (3.485) in the
previous regression and positive (1.834) in the regression excluding LENDERS.  The
values of the remaining coefficients are similar to those in the previous regression,
although the levels of significance are slightly different in a few cases.  For example,
both Y_OUT and OLD_OUT are significant at the five percent level, as opposed to
one percent previously.  The overall explanatory power does not change when
LENDERS is excluded (adjusted R-square equals .235).
Little harm, then, results from excluding the possibly endogenous LENDERS.
If no suitable instruments for the variable could be found in order to perform a TSLS,
then it could be dropped from the analysis altogether without changing the picture
that emerges from the regressions: family and community ties of an area do indeed
influence demand for reverse mortgages.
V.1.C. Possible heteroscedasticity in OLS95
The error terms in the OLS regression may be heteroscedastic.  If this were
true, then OLS might not be the appropriate econometric specification for this study,
and an alternative specification such as a weighted least squares or a log-linear form
might be preferred.  Although, in the presence of heteroscedasticity, the OLS
estimators are unbiased, the estimated variances are biased, invalidating tests of
significance.96
The possibility of heteroscedasticity in the OLS regressions reported here may
be illustrated as follows.  Consider a model in which the dependent variable is
continuous.  Let yij be the value of this variable for the ith person in the jth county.  At
the individual level, the model is:
yij = α + βxij + uij, [Equation 1]
                                                
95 Significant input in this section by Michael Grossman of the NBER is gratefully acknowledged.
96 Maddala (1992), Ch.5.
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where xij is the independent variable or a vector of these variables, and uij is the
disturbance term with a mean of zero.  Assume homoscedasticity at the individual
level:
.Eu 22ij σ=
Now average Equation 1 over the nj old homeowners composing potential demand in
the jth county to get
yj = α + βxj + uj,
where yj, xj, and uj are means.  In this paper, yj = HECM9000.  If nj varies among










That is, the disturbance may be inversely related to the size of potential demand in the
county.97
Whites general test of heteroscedasticity was used to determine whether or
not it is likely that the OLS disturbances are biased in this manner.98  To conduct the
test, the OLS residuals were squared and then regressed on a constant, the inverse of
potential demand, and the squared inverse of potential demand.  The number of
observations was multiplied the resulting R-square to obtain the test statistic, which is
asymptotically distributed as χ2[2] (the degrees of freedom equals the number of
regressors, excluding the constant).
In this instance, the χ2[2] statistic equals 0.8643, far below the critical value of
9.22 at the one percent significance level; therefore, the null hypothesis that OLS is
homoscedastic is not rejected.  The significance tests on the OLS coefficients that
were discussed in the preceding section therefore are valid.
V.2. Two-stage least squares
As discussed in Section IV.5, BANKS, MARRYKID, and INCOME are used as
instruments for the possibly endogenous LENDERS in the TSLS regression.  An F-
test of their joint significance reveals that, as a group, these are strong instruments for
LENDERS (F-ratio equals 23.04).99
                                                
97 One possible solution to this specific form of heteroscedasticityif indeed it existswould be to
compute a weighted least squares regression using the square root of nj as weights.  [Johnston and
Dinardo (1997), pp.171-172.]
98 White (1980).
99 In the first stage of the TSLS, MARRYKID (coefficient of .1133) and BANKS (coefficient of .0568)
are significant at the one percent level (two-tailed).  INCOME (coefficient of .00002) is insignificant.
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The results of the TSLS regression are strikingly similar to the OLS results in
that all of the coefficients are nearly identical, as are their levels of significance.  The
only difference, a relatively minor one, is that the coefficient on LENDERS is about
10 percent lower in the TSLS regression, and its level of significance is five percent
instead of one percent.
Thus, the TSLS regression adds virtually nothing to the story already told by
OLS.  This, along with the findings discussed in Section V.1.B regarding the OLS
regression excluding LENDERS, suggests that LENDERS is not endogenous.  A
Hausman χ2-test of the consistency of OLS provides further confirmation that the
OLS specification reported in Section V.1.A is suitable for the purposes of this
study.100  The findings in that section that family and community ties influence
demand for reverse mortgages are sound.
                                                
100 The test is sometimes interpreted as testing the endogeneity of a particular variable, but technically
this is incorrect.  The null hypothesis of the test, which is performed under the assumption that the
OLS estimates are efficient and that the TSLS estimates are inefficient and consistent, is that the




Reverse mortgages are loans against home equity that do not have to be repaid
until the borrower moves, sells the home, or dies.  This paper explores whether an
areas family and community ties influence demand for one type of reverse
mortgagethe HECMbut the implications extend to other types of reverse
mortgages.  Although several previous studies obtained estimates of the potential
demand for reverse mortgages, this is the first study, to my knowledge, of how actual
demand may be determined, and of how it may be related to potential demand.
The evidence concerning the impact of market development is mixed:
although the number of active HECM lenders (adjusted for potential demand in the
area) is found to have a significantly positive effect upon demand, the number of
HECM counselors is found not to have a significant effect, and is negative in the two
regressions that include the lenders variable.  This could be due to the measurement
imperfections of the variable noted in Section IV.5.
Race is found to influence demandthe higher the percent of the population
that is white, the greater the demand.  The overall educational achievement of an area
has a significant, positive influence on demand, suggesting that more financially
sophisticated individuals are likelier to be receptive to the complicated reverse
mortgage loan.
Fairly strong evidence is found that family and community ties do influence
demand for reverse mortgages.  One exception among the variables relating to family
or community ties is the variable on religious adherence.  Degree of religious
adherence is not found to be significant; indeed, the coefficient on that variable has
the wrong sign (positive) in all three regressions.  Perhaps religious organizations are
involved in educating their older members about reverse mortgages.  If so, then this
would have a positive influence on demand that would confound the negative
influence of the family ties that the variable is intended to reflect.
The other variables on family or community ties provide more convincing
results.
The variable Y_OUT is significantly positive in all of the regressions,
suggesting that weak family and community ties among the young have a positive
influence on demand.  OLD_OUT is significantly negative across the regressions:
when the ties by older persons to their communities are weak, demand for reverse
mortgages will be low.  Demand is predicted to fall when the percent of persons who
were born in the same state as their current residence rises.
A much more ambitious research project would involve estimating potential
demand for many counties throughout the United States.  Unless only metropolitan
area counties are analyzed, such a project would also entail redefining out-migration,
which in this paper has been defined as moving from a county and out of that
countys metropolitan area.  Also, calculating out-migration figures is quite
cumbersome and time-consuming, as the data are not machine-readable, and must be
cut and pasted from user-friendly tables available on CD-ROMs prepared by the
Census.  Perhaps new out-migration data that will be available from the 2000 census
will be easier to manipulate.
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The 50 initial lenderseach authorized to originate up to 50 HECMsin the
HECM demonstration were selected by lottery.  Selection was based upon ten HUD
regions, and the proportion of the nations total older homeowners who resided in
these regions.  According to HUD (1990), the Department [HUD] could have
selected demonstration areas, defined by community or [s]tate. . .  [but did not] on the
ground that the Department should not prejudge which communities. . . were suitable
participants.101  While this strategy for initiating the demonstration may be
understandable, the results of this study suggest that targeting areas of weak family
ties, and areas where the old are unlikely to migrate out of the community, might
have improved the success of the program.
Initiation of the HECM program was motivated largely by the desire to assist
low-income, older homeowners.  The HECM, essentially a federally subsidized
reverse mortgage, meets this desire by offering older homeowners a way to convert
their home equity into cash.  The findings of this study suggest that governmental
agencies and financial institutions should be sensitive to family and community ties
when designing and marketing programs, such as the HECM, that are intended to
help older individuals.  The kinds of outreach and informational efforts that would be
appropriate for a given program, perhaps even the viability of a program altogether,
will depend at least partly on the nature of an areas family and community ties.  In
the present case, more traditional, family-oriented areas are less likely than others to
show interest in reverse mortgages.  This idea may be extended to the international
level.  For example, the reverse mortgage market is unlikely to thrive, at least any
time soon, in such countries as Japan, where intergenerational bonds traditionally are
strong.
                                                
101 op. cit., p.4-13.
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Appendix A.  Explanation of Regression Variables.
The unit of analysis is a county.  All counties analyzed are in one of 26
selected metropolitan areas in the United States.  The expected signs of the regression
coefficients are in parentheses following the variable names.
●Dependent variable:
HECM9000
The number of Home Equity Conversion Mortgages (HECMs) endorsed
1990-2000 by the Federal Housing Administration for borrowers residing in
the county, divided by potential demand for reverse mortgages in the county
in 1989, times 1,000.
Potential demand equals the number of homeowners aged 70 and over who
have $30,000 or more in home equity.  Rasmussen, Megbolugbe and Morgan
(1995) estimated potential demand for selected (P)MSAs.  The county-level
figures used in this paper are weighted averages of Rasmussen, Megbolugbe
and Morgans  (P)MSA figures.  The weights are based on the percent of a
(P)MSAs homeowners aged 75 and over who reside in each county (1990
data).  Data on homeowners aged 70 and over were not available, so those
aged 75 and over were used instead.
●Independent variables relating to both family and community ties:
Y_OUT (+)
The percent of residents aged 25-39 in 1985 who moved to a county outside of
the metropolitan area by 1990.
OLD_OUT (-)
The percent of residents aged 60-79 in 1985 who moved to a county outside of
the metropolitan area by 1990.
●Independent variables relating to family ties:
RELIGION (-)
The percent of residents who belong to a religious denomination (1990 data).
BORN_IN (-)
The percent of the population who were born in the countys state (1990 data).
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●Other independent variables that influence demand for HECMs:
WHITE (+)
The percent of the population who are white (1996 data).
ED (+)
The percent of residents aged 25 and over who have graduated from college
(1990 data).
●Measures of the degree to which the HECM market is developed:
LENDERS (+)
The number of lenders who sold HECMs in the county 1990-2000, divided by
potential demand for reverse mortgages in the county in 1989, times 1,000.
COUNSMSA (+)
The number of HUD-approved HECM counselors in the countys
metropolitan area as of March 2001, divided by the metropolitan areas
potential demand for reverse mortgages in 1989, times 1,000.
●The following variables are used as instruments for LENDERS in TSLS regressions:
BANKS
The number of (FDIC-insured) commercial and savings bank offices in the
county as of June 1995 divided by potential demand for reverse mortgages in
the county in 1989, times 1,000.
MARRYKID
The percent of total households composed of married couples living with their
children (1990 data).
INCOME
Median household money income (1993 data).
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Tables and Figures
Table 1. Availability of Different Types of Reverse Mortgages
Type of reverse mortgage  Availability
Multipurpose, private sector loans:
HUD's FHA-insured HECM*  All 50 states and D.C.
Fannie Mae's Home Keeper*  All 50 states and D.C.
Financial Freedom Senior Funding Corporation's
(FFSFC's) Cash Account Plan*
Current availability: AZ, CA, CO,
CT, FL, GA, HI, IL, MD, MI, NV,
NJ, OR, PA, UT, VA, WA, WY,
and Washington, D.C.  Availability
expected by the end of 2001
(according to the FFSFCs
website): IN, KY, ME MA, MN,
NM, NY, NC, OH, TX, VT, WI.
  
Special purpose, public sector loans:
 Deferred payment loans**
Generally offered by local
nonprofit or government agencies
on housing or community
development.
  Property tax deferrals**  
Available in all or parts of CA,
CO, FL, GA, IL, IA, ME, MD,
MA, MI, NH, ND, OR, SD, TN,
TX, UT, VA, WA, WI, WY, and
D.C.
*Availability as of November 2001.
**Availability as of October 1996.
Source: Scholen (1997) for public-sector loans; the FFSFC website <http://www.ffsenior.com/products.htm>
(accessed November 2, 2001), for their Cash Account Plan; and the National Reverse Mortgage Lenders
Association's "Lenders List" at <http://www.reversemortgage.org/Lenders%20Lists/lenderstext.html>,
accessed November 2, 2001, for the HECM and Home Keeper loans.  [Note: Scholen (1997) is an earlier
edition of AARP (2000b), but provides information used here that is not available in the latter publication.]
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Table 2. Itemized Costs on a HECM Loan
1.     Origination Fee: The maximum allowable is the greater of $2,000 or 2% of the
maximum claim amount, which is the lesser of the homes value or FHA 203(b) limit
for the area.  Can vary from lender to lender.  May be financed by the loan.
2.     Closing Costs: These include fees for services such as an appraisal, title search and
insurance, surveys, inspections, recording fees, mortgage taxes, etc.  Generally range
from $1,000 to $1,800, but can be over $3,000 in some states, especially for higher-
valued homes.  Lenders within the same state generally charge the same fees, but there
can be wide interstate differences.  May be financed by the loan.
3.     Mortgage Insurance: Charge in two parts: (1) an up-front premium of 2% of the
maximum claim amount, and (2) a monthly premium of 1/12 of 0.5% of the
outstanding principal balance.  May be financed with the loan.  The insurance
premiums are collected by FHA, which protects borrowers from lender default, and
lenders from cross-over risk.  May be financed by the loan.
4.     Servicing Fee: Generally range from $20 to $30 per month for servicing the loan,
which includes making loan advances, transferring insurance premiums to FHA,
monitoring compliance of the loan agreement (such as maintaining the home and
paying property taxes), and sending account statements.  Fee is added to loan balance
each month.
5.      Interest Rates: Today, all lenders charge the same interest on HECM loans: the 1-
year Treasury security index plus a lenders margin.  The lender's margin is set by
Fannie Mae, which purchases virtually all HECMs (in the secondary market.)  In
November 2001, the lenders margin was 1.50 percentage points for monthly adjustable
loans, and 2.10 points for annually adjusted loans.  While the interest rate applied to the
outstanding balance changes periodically with changes in the T-bill rate over the life of
the loan, the payments to the borrower do not change.  A fixed rate HECM is also
available, but very few have been originated because Fannie Mae will not purchase
fixed rate HECMs.
Source: Scholen (1997), and, for interest rate information, Roger Reynolds and Ken Scholen [private
communications].  The lenders margins were obtained from the National Center for Home Equity
Conversions website <http:\\www.reverse.org> (accessed November 2, 2001).  [Note: Scholen (1997) is
an earlier edition of AARP (2000b), but provides information used here that is not available in the latter
publication.]
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Age Total Females Males Whites Blacks 
65 17.8 19.2 16.0 17.8 16.1
70 14.3 15.5 12.8 14.4 13.0
75 11.3 12.2 10.0 11.3 10.5
80 8.6 9.2 7.5 8.5 8.2 
Life expectancy (in years) 
Table 3. Average Number of Years of Life Remaining,  
Selected Ages, Sex and Race, U.S., 1998 
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Median age (in years) 76 75 74
    
Median annual income*** $10,368 NA $18,607
    
Sex/household composition:    
  Female living alone 59.5% 56.3% 29.6%
  Male living alone 12.4% 13.9% 8.3%
  Living with others 28.1% 29.8% 62.1%
    
Race/Ethnicity:    
  Non-Hispanic White 92.7% 86.4% 87.2%
  Non-Hispanic Black 5.9% 9.2% 7.8%
  Hispanic 0.8% 3.1% 3.7%
  Other 0.6% 1.3% 1.3%
Note: NA = Not Available.
*Minimum age of a HECM borrower is 62 years.  Data are from HECM application materials as of the date of
application.
**For householders aged 65 and over.  Figures are for 1997 [U.S. Census Bureau (1999)], except for median
income, which is for 1995 [U.S. Census Bureau (1997)].
***HUD (2000) warns that the data on the median income of HECM borrowers may not be reliable; hence, the
figure here (taken from HUD [1995]) should be viewed with caution.  (A later analysis of the data revealed
many cases where values were zero or missing.)
Source: For HECM data, HUD (1995) and (2000); for all homeowners, U.S. Census Bureau (1997) and (1999),
except for race/ethnicity [HUD (2000)].
35











 Birmingham, AL  New York, NY
01009 Blount, AL 36005 Bronx, NY
01073 Jefferson, AL 36047 Kings, NY
01115 St. Clair, AL 36061 New York, NY
01117 Shelby, AL 36079 Putnam, NY
01127 Walker, AL 36081 Queens, NY
 Chicago, IL 36085 Richmond, NY
17031 Cook, IL 36087 Rockland, NY
17043 Du Page, IL 36119 Westchester, NY
17111 McHenry, IL  Newark, NJ
 Cleveland, OH 34013 Essex, NJ
39035 Cuyahoga, OH 34027 Morris, NJ
39055 Geauga, OH 34037 Sussex, NJ
39085 Lake, OH 34039 Union, NJ
39103 Medina, OH  Oklahoma City, OK
 Denver, CO 40017 Canadian, OK
08001 Adams, CO 40027 Cleveland, OK
08005 Arapahoe, CO 40083 Logan, OK
08031 Denver, CO 40087 McClain, OK
08035 Douglas, CO 40109 Oklahoma, OK
08059 Jefferson, CO 40125 Pottawatomie, OK
 Indianapolis, IN  Philadelphia, PA-NJ
18011 Boone, IN 34005 Burlington, NJ
18057 Hamilton, IN 34007 Camden, NJ
18059 Hancock, IN 34015 Gloucester, NJ
18063 Hendricks, IN 42017 Bucks, PA
18081 Johnson, IN 42029 Chester, PA
18097 Marion, IN 42045 Delaware, PA
18109 Morgan, IN 42091 Montgomery, PA
18145 Shelby, IN 42101 Philadelphia, PA
 (continued on next page)   












 K.C., MO-KS  Pittsburg, PA
20091 Johnson, KS 42003 Allegheny, PA
20103 Leavenworth, KS 42051 Fayette, PA
20121 Miami, KS 42125 Washington, PA
20209 Wyandotte, KS 42129 Westmoreland, PA
29037 Cass, MO  Portland, OR
29047 Clay, MO 41005 Clackamas, OR
29095 Jackson, MO 41051 Multnomah, OR
29107 Lafayette, MO 41067 Washington, OR
29165 Platte, MO 41071 Yamhill, OR
29177 Ray, MO  Rochester, NY
 L.A./Orange Co., CA 36051 Livingston, NY
06037 Los Angeles, CA 36055 Monroe, NY
06059 Orange, CA 36069 Ontario, NY
 Memphis, TN-AR-MS 36073 Orleans, NY
05035 Crittenden, AR 36117 Wayne, NY
28033 De Soto, MS  Salt Lake City, UT
47157 Shelby, TN 49011 Davis, UT
47167 Tipton, TN 49035 Salt Lake, UT
 Minneapolis, MN-WI 49057 Weber, UT
27003 Anoka, MN  Seattle, WA
27019 Carver, MN 53033 King, WA
27025 Chisago, MN 53061 Snohomish, WA
27037 Dakota, MN  Tampa, FL
27053 Hennepin, MN 12053 Hernando, FL
27059 Isanti, MN 12057 Hillsborough, FL
27123 Ramsey, MN 12101 Pasco, FL
27139 Scott, MN 12103 Pinellas, FL
27163 Washington, MN  Buffalo, NY
27171 Wright, MN 36029 Erie, NY
55109 St. Croix, WI   
(continued on next page)   












 New Orleans, LA  Atlanta, GA
22051 Jefferson Parish, LA 13013 Barrow, GA
22071 Orleans Parish, LA 13035 Butts, GA
22087 St. Bernard Parish, LA 13057 Cherokee, GA
22089 St. Charles Parish, LA 13063 Clayton, GA
22095 St. John the Baptist Parish, LA 13067 Cobb, GA
22103 St. Tammany Parish, LA 13077 Coweta, GA
 Miami, FL 13089 DeKalb, GA
12025 Dade, FL 13097 Douglas, GA
 Phoenix, AZ 13113 Fayette, GA
04013 Maricopa, AZ 13117 Forsyth, GA
 San Diego, CA 13121 Fulton, GA
06073 San Diego, CA 13125 Gwinnett, GA
 San Francisco, CA 13151 Henry, GA
06041 Marin, CA 13217 Newton, GA
06075 San Francisco, CA 13223 Paulding, GA
06081 San Mateo, CA 13247 Rockdale, GA
 Milwaukee, WI 13255 Spalding, GA
55079 Milwaukee, WI 13297 Walton, GA
55089 Ozaukee, WI   
55131 Washington, WI   
55133 Waukesha, WI   
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HECM9000 11.44 12.25 0.37 65.11
Y_OUT 14.86 5.54 5.47 31.38
OLD_OUT 6.10 2.42 1.82 14.61
RELIGION 54.92 13.73 25.90 84.50
BORN_IN 64.27 16.50 18.70 90.02
MARRYKID 29.92 7.10 9.79 47.12
WHITE 85.50 14.21 33.90 99.50
INCOME 38,115 8,924 20,710 63,560
ED 20.94 8.52 6.70 44.00
LENDERS 1.93 1.67 0.15 10.03
COUNSMSA 0.16 0.18 0.02 0.77
BANKS 13.54 7.07 3.79 43.22
Note: Number of observations is 129.
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RELIGION -0.092 -0.184 1
BORN_IN -0.503 -0.449 0.481 1
MARRYKID -0.289 -0.010 -0.018 0.350 1
WHITE -0.276 0.065 -0.258 0.172 0.599 1
INCOME 0.052 0.501 -0.142 -0.028 0.579 0.482 1
ED 0.508 0.507 -0.077 -0.375 -0.176 -0.052 0.591 1
LENDERS -0.120 -0.004 -0.062 0.184 0.654 0.335 0.402 -0.073 1
COUNSMSA 0.378 -0.148 0.203 0.129 0.053 -0.235 -0.236 -0.116 0.101 1
BANKS -0.004 0.025 -0.016 -0.051 0.461 0.137 0.494 0.285 0.470 0.068 1
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Y_OUT     0.767
 **     
(0.296)
  0.666 *
(0.310)
    0.756 **
(0.299)




















WHITE   0.141
 *
(0.081)
   0.221 **
(0.082)
   0.149 **      
(0.086)
ED    0.346
 **
(0.144)
   0.359 **
(0.151)








LENDERS    2.265
 **
(0.622)









Number of obs. 129 129 129
Adj R-squared 0.235 0.235 0.234
Root MSE 10.718 10.718 10.725
Hausman χ2-test of the
consistency of OLS --- --- 0.09
F-ratio from a test of the joint
significance of the instrumental
variables F[3, 118]
--- --- 23.04
 Significant at 10% (one-tailed test).
* Significant at 5% (one-tailed test).
** Significant at 1% (one-tailed test).
1 Coefficients are reported (standard errors in parentheses).
2 Instrumented: LENDERS.  Instruments: BANKS, MARRYKID, INCOME.
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Figure 1. Out-Migration Matrix








Explanation: "YOUNG" means that a low percent of young
people move out of the county's metropolitan area; "young"




●Potential demand for selected metropolitan areas:
Rasmussen, Megbolugbe and Morgan (1995).
●Number of FHA-insured HECMs by county, lender, and year:
Data were obtained from HUD.
●Number of HUD-approved housing counseling agencies that provide HECM
counseling:
Data by state and zip code were obtained from HUDs Housing Counseling
Clearinghouse website, <http://www.hudhcc.org/agencies/hcamap.html>, accessed
March 19, 2001.  Counts of HECM counselors by county (and thus by metropolitan
area) were derived by using Insight Software Solutions Zip Express 2000 software to
match county names to zip codes.
●County-level out-migration, by age, 1985-1990:
U.S. Census Bureau (1990a).
●Other county-level variables:
U.S. Census Bureau (1998).
U.S. Census Bureau (1990b).
Bradley, et al (1992).
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About the International Longevity Center
The International Longevity Center-USA (ILC) is a not-for-profit, nonpartisan
research, policy, and education organization whose mission is to help societies
address the issues of population aging and longevity in positive and constructive ways
and to highlight older peoples productivity and contributions to their families and to
society as a whole.
The organization is part of a multinational research, policy, and education consortium
with centers in the United States, Japan, Great Britain, France, and the Dominican
Republic.  These centers work both autonomously and collaboratively to study the
impact of increased life expectancy and higher proportions of older people on nations
around the world.
The International Longevity Center-USA is located at 60 East 86th Street, New York,
New York, 10028. The phone number is (212) 288-1468. The ILC website is
www.ilcusa.org.
The International Longevity Center is an affiliate of Mount Sinai School of Medicine.
